Philosophica 78 (2006) pp. 53-68

TESTIMONY, ENGINEERED KNOWLEDGE AND INTERNALISM

Dan O'Brien

ABSTRACT

Testimonial knowledge sometimes depends on internalist epistemic conditions, those that thinkers are able to reflect upon. In the testimony literature the only internalist conditions that are considered are those concerning a hearer's knowledge of a speaker's reliability. I argue, however, that the relevant sense of "internal" should not be seen as referring to just the hearer's point of view, but rather to the points of view of both the hearer and the speaker. There are certain cases of testimonial knowledge transmission that depend on the speaker's knowledge of his audience. These include cases of "engineered knowledge" in which a speaker deviously manipulates a hearer's beliefs. Such knowledge is therefore internalist because it depends on factors that are internal to the point of view of the speaker, and not merely on externalist factors such as the reliability of the speakers' and hearers' beliefs.

1. Internalist, Externalist and Hybrid Epistemologies of Testimony

Internalists claim that in order to have knowledge our beliefs must be justified by mental states that are "cognitively accessible" to the thinker. Depending on one's version of internalism, these mental states may include what is known or justifiably believed by the thinker, what she can note the presence of by more or less intense reflection, or states of which she is immediately conscious.[1] Externalists deny that knowledge requires any such consciousness or reflection on the part of the thinker. Reliabilists are externalist in their approach: they claim that knowledge simply consists in true beliefs that are acquired via a reliable method,

[1] See Alston (1988) for discussion of these various versions of epistemological internalism.

that is, via a method that tends to produce true beliefs. Whether and how a certain method is reliable need not be known or even knowable by the thinker herself.

With regard to testimony, internalists argue that there must be reasons accessible to the hearer (*H*) to think that a speaker's (*S*) report is true. If I am to acquire a justified testimonial belief from Herbert, I must be able to run through something like the following in my mind: Herbert is a usually reliable speaker and a knowledgeable plumber; he tells me that my central heating needs replacing; given his reliability this is likely to be true; I therefore believe that my central heating needs replacing. Usually, of course, I just believe what people say without performing such an inference, but the internalist claim is that I must *be able to* articulate some such supporting inference if my testimonial beliefs are to be justified. It is such beliefs about the reliability of reporters and such inferences that must be cognitively accessible to thinkers if they are to have testimonial knowledge.

There are, however, certain problems with the basic internalist, inferentialist picture. In most cases we have not collected enough empirical evidence in order to be able to go through the necessary reasoning. I may know that Herbert is reliable, but I have no evidence concerning the reliability of Derek the electrician; it would seem, though, that I am nevertheless justified in believing what he says about the state of my wiring.

There are two suggested ways to accommodate for the possibility of testimonial knowledge even though we do not have the requisite empirical evidence in support of certain testimonial beliefs. First, variants of the internalist picture have been developed. Fricker and Adler, for example, claim that we rightly trust others without being able to check out the track record of individual speakers; nevertheless, our trust is grounded in background empirical evidence. Fricker (2002, p. 381) claims that:

> On almost any actual occasion of testimony, a normally knowledgeable adult will be absolutely awash with relevant circumstantial evidence bearing on the question of whether the speaker is to be trusted on her topic. She will have, in the cognitive background in light of which she approaches fresh instances of testimony, a multitude of background beliefs about human and non-human nature which are relevant to whether this

> fresh instance of testimony, this current invitation to believe on trust in the teller, is indeed to be trusted or not.

And Adler (2002, p. 17), that:

> We have vast, easily obtained background beliefs that serve as reasons or evidence to support our acceptance of the word of the speaker.

Such background evidence for the reliability of speakers is multifarious. First, we do have some empirical evidence that many testimonial reports have been correct in the past. Thus "our maintenance of the default rule reflects a resilient history of overwhelmingly reliable testimony" (Adler, 2002, p. 153). And from reports that we have been able empirically to confirm, we have learnt to spot signs of both sincerity and deceit in the actions and voices of speakers, and we can look out for these signs on future occasions.[2] We monitor speakers for signs of insincerity, and for reports that may not sit well with other things we have heard and other things that we know: "she [*H*] should be continually evaluating him [*S*] for trustworthiness throughout their exchange." (Fricker, 1994, p. 150) We also acquire evidence that enables us to form generalisations concerning the reliability of certain types of person: philosophy professors know more about formal logic than footballers, and people over the age of 30 know very little about XBoxLive. Adler further suggests that our knowledge of the consequences of error with respect to certain forms of testimony, provides empirical support for the usual veracity of such talk: astrologers can be wrong without much comeback, whereas epidemiologists cannot – this provides us with a reason to think that the reports of epidemiologists are likely to be true. The beliefs that we acquire via testimony also tend to cohere both with other testimonial reports and with what we have previously learnt via perception and can recall via memory, and this provides empirical support for the reliability of such testimony (and, reciprocally, for the reliability of those beliefs based on perception and memory). Lastly, the best explanation for the fact that people's testimony is generally in agreement is that their testimony is usually reliable.

[2] Although for a certain scepticism with respect to this claim, see O. G. Wellborn (1991).

An alternative response to the claim that we often lack empirical evidence concerning a speaker's testimony is to reject internalism and adopt externalism. *H* does not require any such evidence concerning the reliability of *S*; all that is required is that *S* is in fact reliable.

Various writers have also suggested hybrid accounts of testimony. Lackey argues that testimonial knowledge requires that both internalist and externalist conditions are satisfied. First, rationality requires that a thinker is aware of good internalist reasons why her beliefs are true. This alone, though, is not sufficient for knowledge: one's beliefs also need to have a reliable source; the latter, then, being an external epistemic condition. Lackey (2006b, p. 16) claims that

> it takes two to tango: the justificatory work of testimonial beliefs can be shouldered neither exclusively by the hearer nor by the speaker.

Thus:

> It is, therefore, not enough for testimonial justification that a hearer have even epistemically excellent reasons for accepting a speaker's testimony – the speaker must also do her part in the testimonial exchange by offering testimony that is reliable or otherwise truth-conducive. (Lackey, 2006a, p. 10)

Alston (1988) offers a similar account. He argues that a belief is justified if it is based on adequate grounds. Such grounds must be psychological states of the thinker: the ground for the belief that my tea is sweet is my experience of sweetness. Grounds are therefore construed internally. Whether or not such grounds are adequate, however, is an external matter. Adequacy amounts to reliability or truth-conduciveness.[3]

Hybrid theorists are dissatisfied with the bipolar nature of the internalism/externalism debate, and I also argue that testimonial knowledge does not have to slot into a model that is either internalist and inferentialist, or externalist and reliabilist. I do not claim, though, that *H* must satisfy an externalist condition in addition to possessing reasons to

[3] For a hybrid account of knowledge in general, see Sellars (1997, p. 74): "To be an expression of knowledge, a report must not only have authority, this authority must in some sense be recognised by the person whose report it is".

believe *S*, and I shall ignore the question of whether *S* must be reliable in order for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge to occur. Instead, I shall focus on internalism, and I shall argue for a distinct version.[4] Internalism is so named because the relevant justificatory factors are internal to the point of view of the knower; they are something upon which the knower can reflect. In testimonial exchanges, therefore, such justificatory factors are seen as internal to the point of view of *H*. I claim, however, that there are cases of testimonial knowledge in which *S* plays a crucial epistemic role, and this role amounts to more than the ability to be a reliable reporter. *S*'s epistemic role cannot be construed externally as a hybrid theorist such as Lackey claims; rather, *S* needs to have a certain kind of awareness of the conversation in which he is engaged and of his audience. I argue that such cases of testimonial knowledge motivate a form of internalism; one, though, that is relative to *S*'s and not *H*'s point of view. I shall call this "speaker-internalism".

2. The Epistemic Role of the Speaker in Cases of Engineered Knowledge

It is lucky in various ways that at the Rolling Stones concert last night I acquired the knowledge that Keith Richards is right handed; before then I had always believed that he was left handed. In some sense it is lucky that I was in a position to acquire such knowledge given that the concert was sold out and I only managed to get in because there were some returned tickets. This is what Pritchard (2005) calls capacity epistemic luck, where "it is lucky that the agent is capable of knowledge" (2005, p. 134). It is also lucky that the concert went ahead at all given Keith's recent fall out of the coconut tree; it could very easily have been cancelled due to his ill health. This is evidential epistemic luck, where "it is lucky that the agent acquires the evidence that she has in favour of her

[4] My version of internalism could contribute either to a pure internalist account or to a hybrid theory, depending on whether or not *S*'s reliability is also necessary for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge.

belief" (2005, p. 136). These forms of luck, and others discussed by Pritchard, are compatible with knowledge.[5]

There are, however, two forms of luck that are epistemologically more important; these are reflective and veritic epistemic luck. For now let us concentrate on the latter. Veritic epistemic luck applies when a thinker's beliefs are true by accident. Gettier cases are good examples of the influence of such luck: my belief that my partner is unexpectedly at home rather than at work is (seemingly) justified by my hearing her voice when I return from the shops; what I am hearing, though, is a dictaphone recording that I earlier left playing; nevertheless, my belief happens to be true because coincidentally she has taken the day off work through illness. In the rest of this section I shall suggest scenarios in which it is *S*'s knowledge of *H* that rules out veritic epistemic luck, and thus *S*'s knowledge of *H* that plays a vital epistemic role. We shall return below to reflective epistemic luck, and to how reflective and veritic luck are seen as relevant to the debate between internalism and externalism.

The cases in which I am interested involve *S*'s devious manipulation of *H*'s beliefs, and there is a recipe with which one can concoct such scenarios: (i) *S* lies to *H*; (ii) *S* intends *H* to acquire true information from his lie; and (iii) *H* comes to know what *S* intends him to. These are what I call cases of "engineered knowledge".

Perhaps fraudulent results in science can be used to transmit knowledge. A scientist knows his theory is correct, yet his latest results are not very clear-cut. Fabricating data would therefore be a better way of spreading knowledge of his theory. A graph is presented at a lecture to show how $x = y^2$ (x, say, is the rate of global warming and y the rate of car production). The audience come to believe that $x = y^2$; and this is a true belief. The graph, though, has been made up – this particular set of data has never been collected – but the scientist knows that audiences are likely to believe theories that are backed up by neat graphical representations of data. (Newton admitted 'adjusting' his data so that it would be easier to see how it supported his theory of gravity, and Mendel did the same for his data concerning genetic inheritance.)[6] In such a case

[5] Pritchard (2005, pp. 133–41) also discusses content epistemic luck and doxastic epistemic luck.

[6] See Barnes (1994, p. 55). Also see Shapin (1993, p. 339) for the claim that Pascal was similarly devious.

it is plausible that the scientist's knowledge (of global warming) is transmitted to his audience, albeit by devious means.

Gillian Michell (1990, p. 189) discusses cases in which women have to lie, or "tell it slant", in order to get their point across in a male-dominated sexist society:

> For a woman to achieve the maximally effective exchange of information in a sexist setting…her only solution is a judicious and covert violation of the conversational rules that we call telling it slant. So what a woman gains by telling it slant is the means of communicating information effectively

And getting it across to an ex-lover that "it's over" may only be possible if one says that there's somebody else; only by lying in this way can *H* come to accept and to know the truth.[7]

Lastly, Dianne knows that Sam is sexist, and she wants him to know that her driving instructor is terrible. The instructor is male, but Sam would never believe that a man could be a bad teacher or a bad driver. Thus, in describing her lessons Dianne says that "*she* [the teacher] doesn't seem to know what she's doing"; Dianne knows what Sam is likely to accept as true. This has the desired effect: Sam comes to believe that Dianne's instructor is poor. This belief is true and, given Dianne's intention, it is not acquired by accident; it is therefore very plausible that Sam comes to acquire knowledge concerning the instructor, this knowledge having been transmitted by Dianne's testimony. In all these cases, then, lies are used to pass on knowledge, and they can only do so because *S* knows how *H* is likely to think in these scenarios. It is *S*'s knowledge of *H*'s mind that rules out the mere lucky acquisition of true belief.

The claim that these cases involve the transmission of *knowledge* may not be persuasive if *H*'s (alleged) knowledge is seen as inferential, if, that is, Sam infers that "the instructor is poor" from Dianne's assertion that "*she* doesn't seem to know what she's doing", or one infers that "it's over" from an ex-lover's claim that "there's somebody else". Here inferences are made from false beliefs, and some would see this as

[7] I have discussed the examples above in my (2007) where I argue that mendacious testimony can be used to transmit knowledge.

undermining any claims to knowledge.[8] First, it should be noted that Sam does not consciously run through such reasoning in his head; he just *hears* that the instructor is poor. Nevertheless, the notion of unconscious inference is widely accepted and would seem to apply to such cases. Here, though, this does not undermine claims to knowledge. We must be clear on the rationale behind the prohibition on false beliefs. It is seen as lucky if a thinker arrives at a true conclusion from false premises, and so it is claimed that such reasoning cannot lead to the acquisition of knowledge. In the cases that I have highlighted, though, it is not lucky that *H* comes to have certain true beliefs because these situations are engineered by *S* in order that this is so.

The key claim of this paper is that in these scenarios there is an important internalist factor necessary for the transmission of testimonial knowledge: this is *S*'s awareness of how *H* is likely to think. This is distinct from the kind of internalist factor cited by inferentialists, that which involves *H*'s awareness of *S*'s reliability. In the driving lesson scenario, for example, Sam would not acquire knowledge of the driving instructor if Dianne did not know of his sexist thinking. This knowledge guides her in what she says to him, and it is Dianne's insight into Sam's mind that allows for knowledge transmission in this case; it is her awareness of his sexism that rules out the mere lucky acquisition of a true belief concerning the instructor.

I do not, however, want to claim that these factors provide "justification" for Sam's thoughts. In the internalist tradition, justification is essentially connected with the epistemic praiseworthiness of the believer. Sam's beliefs may be true, but they are not praiseworthy given that they are driven by sexism.[9] The acquisition of engineered

[8] See Lehrer (1964–5).

[9] The lack of epistemic praiseworthiness on Sam's part can also be seen as threatening the plausible claim that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and rational action, that is, we should act on what we know, and, in doing so, we are acting rationally. Sam does act on what he knows: he avoids learning to drive with this instructor because he knows the instructor is not very good. But again, it does not sound right to call this action rational given its grounding in his sexist thinking.

knowledge depends on non-justificatory yet internalist epistemic factors, those that are speaker- rather than hearer-centred.[10]

3. Externalist Construals of the Speaker's Epistemic Role

There are, however, various ways that it could be claimed that my speaker-internalism is just a form of externalism, and that no new distinctions have been drawn. It could, for example, be admitted that in order for Sam to acquire knowledge, Dianne must know how he is likely to think; Dianne's knowledge, though, could be construed externally. Dianne must have knowledge of Sam's mind, but this need only amount to the reliable ability to form beliefs about Sam's thinking (and perhaps for such beliefs to cause her devious behaviour). Dianne need not, however, be able to reflect upon her devious strategy and the role that her beliefs about Sam play in his acquisition of knowledge, or, if she is so aware, such reflection would have no epistemic role. I reject such a response: Dianne's knowledge of Sam's mind must amount to more than the possession of such a reliable ability. Consider a scenario in which Dianne says the very same things in the very same circumstances to Sam, although she does not reflect upon, or she is not capable of reflecting upon, how and why her words would lead to him having true beliefs about the driving instructor. If asked why she falsely referred to the instructor as "she", Dianne would not be able to answer. In such a scenario we would not want to say that Dianne provides Sam with knowledge. Without any reflection on Dianne's part it would appear to be lucky that Sam arrives at his true belief about the instructor.[11] This is a

[10] Fricker's inferentialist claim is that "she [*H*] should be continually evaluating him [*S*] for trustworthiness throughout their exchange." (Fricker, 1994, p. 150) My claim is that sometimes, if *S* wants to impart knowledge to *H*, then he should be continually evaluating the hearer's epistemic credentials and her susceptibility to the acquisition of engineered knowledge.

[11] Of course it is not lucky that Sam arrives at his true belief given Dianne's reliable engineering, although this kind of case is one that would seem to call for a qualified form of externalism: reliable cognitive processes are sufficient for knowledge unless the thinker falsely believes that his cognition is not reliable (see Bonjour & Sosa, 2003, pp. 30–3), or, according to my variant of this position, reliable cognitive processes are sufficient for knowledge unless a

case of engineered knowledge and it therefore requires planning and execution, both of which demand the engineer's awareness, in this case the engineer being Dianne.

It was claimed earlier that Sam's beliefs may not be justified even though he possesses knowledge. Another externalist strategy, though, would be to argue that Sam's beliefs are justified, not by his reasoning alone, but by the overall process engineered by Dianne. And it is this justification that can be given an externalist construal, and this that explains why Sam should be seen as acquiring knowledge. Dianne initiates a cognitive process in Sam's mind, one that reliably leads to true beliefs in the kinds of circumstances in which Dianne triggers this mechanism. Sam's reasoning may not be praiseworthy, but the claim here is that the overall process is; perhaps not morally because of Dianne's deception, but it is epistemically praiseworthy given that the process she initiates leads to true beliefs. There are, though, various problems with such an account of justification. First, as suggested earlier, whether or not a belief is justified is usually taken to reflect upon the thinker himself, that is: "the proper function of the concept of justification, [is] to provide a certain kind of positive evaluation. The praiseworthiness of an action or belief is related to the praiseworthiness of the agent or subject". (Bird, 2007, p. 27) Saying that a belief is justified is a way of saying something epistemically positive about the thinker who has that belief, and there is some tension here in praising Sam's sexist thinking.

Second, the essence of reliabilist accounts of justification or knowledge is that there are causal processes that reliably lead to a thinker having true beliefs. Our perceptual mechanisms are plausibly examples of such reliable processes. The kind of process triggered when I stare at expanses of green reliably leads to me having the belief "that's green", and in any particular case my belief is justified because such a process is in operation. Such an account, though, is not applicable to cases like that involving Dianne and Sam. Dianne does initiate a certain cognitive mechanism in Sam's mind, and one that in this case leads to him having a true belief. It is, though, the kind of mechanism that takes as input,

---

thinker's reasons for believing that his cognition is reliable are false. Sam thinks that his sexist thinking reliably leads to true beliefs, although the fact that this is false undermines any claims to knowledge that Dianne's engineering may be seen to endorse. Thus qualified externalism would not attribute knowledge to Sam in this kind of case.

representations of women – either linguistic or perceptual – and gives as output, certain beliefs about their inferiority. Such a cognitive process is not reliable unless Dianne or someone equally cunning is there to engineer the situation. An externalist, therefore, does not seem to be able to use reliability to ground the claim that in these scenarios *H* has knowledge.

The reason why it is difficult to provide a reliabilist account of the epistemology of these situations is that testimonial knowledge is social; it involves two thinkers, and thus any account that only refers to the cognitive mechanisms of one of these thinkers will miss the sometimes crucial epistemic role of the other protagonist. With this in mind, perhaps a purer form of externalism could be suggested. The processes involved do not have to be limited to those that are physically internal to *H*. There is a wider process here, one that involves the cognitive mechanisms of Dianne *and* Sam, and the interaction of these with certain kinds of situations in the world. This kind of mechanism could be reliable, and it could be this that justifies Sam's thoughts.

Goldman (1999, p. 130n.) distinguishes two kinds of reliabilist account, those that are intrapersonal and those that are transpersonal. Intrapersonal accounts focus on the cognitive mechanisms of *H*, whereas transpersonal ones involve those of both *H* and *S*. The examples he offers in support of the latter are cases in which a hearer's cognition is reliable yet the speaker's is not. *S*, for example, may pass on a belief that she acquired via an unreliable mechanism. According to a transpersonal account, the resultant hearer's belief would be unjustified because the cognitive processes of both *S* and *H* must be reliable in order for *H*'s thoughts to have justification. This form of reliabilism accords with an intuitive account of the transmission of epistemic properties: testimony cannot generate new epistemic properties – it can only pass on whatever the speaker's thoughts already possess, be that justification, warrant or knowledge.[12] This kind of account, though, is of no help with my scenarios. In them, *S*'s mechanisms may be reliable, but *H*'s are not, and

[12] Cf. Kusch's generative account of testimony in which "[t]estimony is not just a means of transmission of complete items of knowledge from and to an individual. Testimony is almost always generative of knowledge." (2002, p. 12) Lackey (1999) also discusses a case where *H* acquires knowledge which *S* does not have (a pupil who learns the theory of evolution from a teacher who is a creationist); and see Peter Graham, this volume.

thus *H*'s beliefs would come out as unjustified on a transpersonal account. Such an account cannot therefore provide a reliabilist explanation of how Sam's thoughts are justified and how they therefore amount to knowledge.

For a reliabilist to account successfully for such scenarios, the focus must be taken off individual thinkers completely. The question of whether the relevant process is reliable cannot be answered by looking cumulatively at the thinking of both the hearer and the speaker. What is needed is an account in which justification is based on the reliability of the social interaction between *S* and *H*. Such interactions are reliable when they tend to produce true belief on the part of the hearer, and this interaction can be reliable even if *H*'s cognitive mechanisms are not (when, that is, they are considered independently of the manipulation of a devious *S*). I shall not pursue such a line here. One should note, though, that there is a potential defeater of any such developed reliabilist account, and that consists in *S*'s inability to reflect upon her devious strategy. As discussed earlier, if Dianne cannot say why she refers to the instructor as "she", then we would not wish to attribute knowledge to Sam, whether or not the social mechanism involved here is reliable in generating true beliefs. So far, then, we have not found a satisfying externalist construal of engineered knowledge.

4. Varieties of Internalism

It is admittedly tempting to claim that the epistemology involved in cases of engineered knowledge must be externalist in character since the crucial epistemic factor cited – *S*'s knowledge of *H* – is external to *H*'s point of view, and that is what defines the externalist position. I have suggested, though, that engineered knowledge does not sit well within externalist epistemologies. The distinction between internalism and externalism rests on the respective epistemic roles of certain subjective and objective considerations. Externalist knowledge usually depends on objective facts concerning *S*'s reliable belief forming mechanisms; internalist knowledge depends on a thinker's ability to "construct a doxastic principle or procedure *from the inside*, from our own individual vantage point." (Goldman, 1980, p. 32) I claim, however, that "subjective" should be interpreted with respect to the points of view of

both those involved in a testimonial exchange involving engineered knowledge, and the relevant sense of "internal" should also be taken in relation to both protagonists. In normal cases of testimony two conversants form a partnership engaged in the mutual sharing of beliefs and knowledge, and knowledge transmission can only occur if *S* is a reliable testifier. *S*'s reliability is thus focused upon by both externalists and internalists; the former are concerned with *S*'s actual reliability, and the latter with *H*'s evidence for such reliability. In the cases that I have looked at, though, *S* plays a distinct epistemic role, and without the knowledge she has of *H*'s thinking and her devious intentions, knowledge would not be transmitted to *H*. The epistemic role that *S* plays depends on her awareness of how the conversation will be interpreted by *H*, and *S*'s role should therefore be seen as providing a necessary subjective component to this kind of knowledge transmission and thus as motivating an internalist epistemology or an epistemology that includes internalist elements.

The claim that *S*'s epistemic role should be seen as internalist is supported by David Owens' (2000) conception of internalism. He rejects an externalist account of testimony, and of knowledge in general, because it does not take proper account of the relation between justification and doxastic responsibility. Externalism amounts to the view that "unreasonable beliefs are no more down to us than a malfunctioning digestive system would be" (Owens, 2000, p. 133). The justification for a thinker's beliefs must therefore be provided by mental states that can be reflected upon. He is, though, careful to say that this reflection does not have to be performed by the thinker herself. Testimony preserves and passes on evidence and justification acquired by somebody else. My belief that there is lots of dark matter in the universe is justified, not by anything of which I am aware, but by evidence upon which physicists can reflect. This, however, remains an internalist view because

> [e]pistemic internalism, properly construed, is just the view that beliefs need to be justified and that what justifies beliefs are reasons, states of awareness. A given subject need not be aware of the reasons that justify his belief, provided he is entitled to presume there are such reasons. In lumbering themselves with the idea that a reason must coincide in time and person with the belief it justifies, internalists do not define their position, they undermine it. (Owens, 2000, pp. 133-134)

My claim is distinct from that of Owens, but it is certainly in sympathy with the spirit of his account. I have suggested that in the cases discussed there is knowledge without justification; this is something which Owens does not consider. I am claiming that there are non-justificatory conditions necessary for testimonial knowledge and that these should be construed as internalist conditions – as, that is, states of awareness – but these states need not be those of *H*.

Another way to accommodate such cases is with a distinct kind of hybrid position. One does not require an epistemology that involves *H* performing an internalist role and *S* an externalist one. This is the strategy suggested earlier by hybrid theorists such as Lackey and Alston. The claim is rather that *S* herself plays a hybrid role: *S*'s awareness, by definition, is external to *H*'s point of view, but the role that her awareness plays entails that *S*'s role should also be seen as internalist in character. Such an account is hybrid in the sense that *S*'s epistemic role cannot be wholly captured by either internalism or externalism, whereas the usual hybrid accounts involve a purely external role for *S*. According to traditional internalist epistemologies, in order to have knowledge the thinker himself – *H* – must be aware of reasons why his beliefs are likely to be true. Such accounts refer, first, to *H*, and second, to his subjective awareness. Cases of engineered knowledge force us to consider these facets of internalism independently. *H* should not be the sole focus, and these scenarios involve an epistemic role for the subjective awareness of, not *H*, but *S*.

Let us now return to Pritchard's distinction between veritic and epistemic luck. It is these kinds of luck that can be seen as driving the debate between internalism and externalism. Reflective epistemic luck is that which concerns a subject's point of view: given that I think I do not know much about history, it is lucky that I answer the questions in the history exam correctly. Internalists claim that such luck must be ruled out if one is to have knowledge. Externalists, however, claim that such luck is compatible with knowledge; they focus instead on the elimination of veritic epistemic luck, the kind of luck that applies when thinkers have true beliefs or justified true beliefs by accident, when, for example, as in Gettier cases, *p* and a thinker's belief that *p* align by chance. Note, though, that this way of distinguishing internalism and externalism accords with the claim that my examples involve only external epistemic factors, a claim that I reject. Dianne's knowledge of Sam's sexism is not

eliminating reflective epistemic luck from the situation; that was never an issue in this example: from Sam's point of view it is not lucky that he comes to have a true belief about the driving instructor. There is evidence upon which he can reflect: the fact that Dianne, who is usually reliable, told him so (well, in his eyes she did: she told him that the driving instructor was a woman, and therefore a bad instructor). Dianne's knowledge of Sam should rather be seen as eliminating veritic epistemic luck since it is not down to chance that Sam's belief is true – Dianne engineered the situation so that this would be so. As said, this is compatible with an externalist description of these cases, an interpretation that follows from the claim that the engineer's thoughts (Dianne's) are not internal to the hearer's point of view (Sam's) and so, by definition, they must be external epistemic conditions. I have argued, though, that such scenarios highlight a distinct form of speaker-internalism, or a kind of internalist factor that contributes to a hybrid account of *S*'s epistemic role. Such cases of engineered knowledge therefore call for further articulation of the role that epistemic luck plays within epistemology. Reflective epistemic luck is that which the traditional internalist hopes to eliminate. Veritic epistemic luck, however, is relevant to both externalist and hybrid theorists such as Lackey, and also to those scenarios that involve speaker-internalism, or a hybrid role for *S*.

I am not suggesting that speaker-internalism is relevant to all cases of testimonial knowledge transmission. There are various epistemically distinct ways of passing on knowledge from one person to another, and these involve distinct ways of ruling out either veritic or reflective epistemic luck, but there is no need to have an internalist or an externalist account that covers them all.[13]

University of Birmingham
Email: D.Obrien@bham.ac.uk

REFERENCES

Adler, J. (2002). *Belief's Own Ethics*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Alston, W. (1988). "An Internalist Externalism", *Synthese* 74, pp. 265–83.

[13] Thanks to Robert Audi and Duncan Pritchard for helpful comments.

Barnes, J. (1994). *A Pack of Lies: Towards a Sociology of Lying*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Bird, A. (2007). "Justified Judging", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74, pp. 81–110.

Bonjour, L. & Sosa, E., eds. (2003). *Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs Externalism, Foundationalism vs Virtues*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Fricker, E. (1994). "Against Gullibility" in: B. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti, eds., *Knowing From Words,* Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

Fricker, E. (2002). "Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant", *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 33, pp. 373–383.

Goldman, A. (1980). "The Internalist Conception of Justification", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 5, pp. 27–51.

Goldman, A. (1999). *Knowledge in a Social World*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Kusch, M. (2002). *Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Lackey, J. (1999). "Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission", *Philosophical Quarterly* 49, pp. 471–90.

Lackey, J. (2006a). "Introduction" in: J. Lackey & E. Sosa, eds., *The Epistemology of Testimony*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Lackey, J. (2006b). "It Takes Two to Tango" in: J. Lackey & E. Sosa, eds., *The Epistemology of Testimony*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Lehrer, K. (1964–5). "Knowledge, Truth and Evidence", *Analysis* xxv, pp. 168–75.

Michell, G. (1990). "Women and Lying: A Pragmatic and Semantic Analysis of 'Telling it Slant'" in: A. Al-Hibri & M. Simons, eds., *Hypatia Reborn: Essays in Feminist Philosophy,* Indiana University Press. Bloomington & Indianapolis.

Owens, D. (2000). *Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity*, Routledge, London.

O'Brien, D. (2007). "Testimony and Lies", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 57(227), pp. 225–238.

Pritchard, D. H. (2005). *Epistemic Luck*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Sellars, W. (1997). *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Shapin, S. (1994). *A Social History of Truth*, Chicago University Press, Chicago.

Wellborn, O. G. (1991). "Demeanour", *Cornell Law Review* 76, pp. 1075–1105.